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Asymmetric Search and Loss Aversion:  








Price  search  enables  consumers  to  overcome  information  asymmetries,  it  can  lead  to  a 
reduction in price dispersion and it can increase consumer surplus, but search is costly. In 
this paper, an internet survey is conducted among a random sample of 490 drivers in the 
State  of  Ohio  to  answer  the  question,  when  are  consumers  more  likely to  search?  The 
internet survey affords us the opportunity to impose exogenous price changes in a random 
sample  of  gasoline  consumers  to  examine  the  decision-making  process  behind  intended 
search decisions. Results indicate that among the respondents who faced prices below their 
expected price, only 12% chose to search, whereas 45% searched when prices were above. 
Results suggest that asymmetric search can be explained by prospect theory, in the sense that 
consumers evaluate current prices compared to a reference price, and as a consequence they 
value  price  increases  differently  from  price  decreases.  Our  findings  indicate  that  in  the 
gasoline  retail  market,  consumers  are  allowing  retailers  to  extract  consumer  surplus  by 
exhibiting loss aversion because this behavior deters search when the probability of finding a 
lower price is highest. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Price search enables consumers to overcome information asymmetries that arise as a result of being 
unable to observe the entire set of prices, it can lead to a reduction in price dispersion (Lewis, 
(2008); Tapata, (2009)) and it can increase consumer surplus, but search is costly. In this paper, we 
use an internet survey conducted among a random sample of 490 drivers in the State of Ohio to 
examine when consumers are more likely to search, and provide evidence indicating the decision 
making process behind asymmetric search is consistent with loss aversion. Our findings indicate that 
in  the  gasoline  retail  market,  consumers  are  allowing  retailers  to  extract  consumer  surplus  by 
searching asymmetrically because this behavior deters search the consumer observes a high price 
quote, i.e. when the probability of finding a lower price is higher relative to somewhat lower prices. 
There are two features that must be present in a market in order for search to be profitable: 
there must be price dispersion, or else the opportunities to find a different (lower) price would be 
diminished,  and  consumers  must  be  unable  to  perfectly  classify  retailers  as  high  or  low  priced 
(Sorensen, (2001)). In the gasoline retail market, price dispersion can be partially attributed to the 
unique characteristics of the industry, and partially to the lack of consumer search (Tappata, (2009): 
Lewis, (2008); Hastings,  (2004); Shepard, (1993)). Price differences start right before gasoline is 
delivered to the gas station, when the refiner aggregates an additive to the fuel corresponding to its 
brand.  At  the  gas  station  level  the  potential  for  product  differentiation  is  further  increased  by 
decisions  such  as  location,  capacity,  presence  of  a  convenience  store,  car  wash  service,  repair 
facilities and methods of payment available (Tappata, 2009; Lewis, 2008). Additionally, there are 
different contractual arrangements between retail outlets and refiners which imply differences in the 
degree of vertical integration (Tappata, 2009; Deck and Wilson, 2008). Product differentiation makes 
it difficult for consumers to identify low priced retailers even when they are able to observe the 
entire set of prices, thus making it profitable to search. 2 
 
Consumer search can further contribute to price dispersion because it is costly, but also 
because  consumer  search  intensity  is  asymmetric,  i.e.  consumers  search  more  when  prices  rise 
compared to when they fall. Using data from an on-line gas price aggregation site, gasbuddy.com, 
Lewis and Marvel (2010) find that negative price shocks (price increases) trigger search. They report 
that when gasoline prices increase, search intensity increases, but when prices fall search response is 
smaller. As a result, price dispersion decreases when prices rise because, given more consumers are 
searching, the penalty firms face from deviating from the market norm is higher (consumers will 
purchase from another retailer if prices are too high), and price dispersion increases when prices fall 
(Lewis and Marvel, (2010)). When prices fall, consumer surplus decreases because, by not searching, 
consumers are giving up potential gains from search. Lewis and Marvel (2010) state this behavior 
should be accorded the status of a stylized fact.  
While the Lewis and Marvel results are compelling, they are perhaps limited due to the use 
of  web-based  search  sites.  Responses  to  our  survey  of  Ohio  drivers  shows  that  only  5%  of 
respondents search online for gasoline prices, while 67.5% search as they drive by, suggesting that 
asymmetric search could be a feature of online searchers which are not necessarily representative of 
the  gasoline consumer population. Further,  search decisions are endogenous;  that is,  whether a 
consumer  chooses  to  price-shop  or  not  depends  on  her  expectations  about  the  distribution  of 
prices, which in turn depend on the intensity of search. Without exogenous price variation it cannot 
be determined if asymmetric search is consumers’ response to pricing strategies or a behavioral 
issue. Finally, the use of aggregate search data does not allow the examination of how search rules 
are formed. The internet survey affords us the opportunity to exogenously impose price changes on 
consumers searching for gas prices and observe their intended search behavior. 
The survey consists of a choice experiment on willingness to search, where individuals face a 
hypothetical  scenario  where  they  are  driving  in  their  car  and  they  need  to  purchase  gasoline. 3 
 
Individuals are first asked for the price they expect to pay per gallon of gasoline. Next they are asked 
2 sequential questions where they have to choose between purchasing gasoline at a gas station or to 
keep driving for one mile in search of a lower price, but incurring a search cost. At the hypothetical 
gas station, the consumer is given a price quote corresponding to the price he would pay if he 
chooses to purchase gasoline at that station. The price quote is randomly assigned to one of four 
treatments: 2.5% below, 5% below, 2.5% above or 5% above the price the consumer stated he 
expected to pay. The baseline group is the case where the price at the hypothetical gas station is 
equal to the consumer’s expected price. 
Results indicate that among the respondents who faced prices below their expected price, 
only 12% choose to search, whereas 45% search when prices are above, confirming Lewis and 
Marvel (2010) asymmetric search findings. The probability that a person chooses to search decreases 
as the difference between the expected and observed price increases, however, it decreases more 
when prices are 2.5% above expectations than when they are 5% higher. When faced with lower 
posted prices, however, there are no significant differences in the slope on the probability of search 
with  respect  to  price  differentials.  It  is  shown  that  results  are  consistent  with  loss  aversion; 
consumers evaluate current prices compared to a reference price, and as a consequence they value 
price increases differently from price decreases.  
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the choice experiment; Section 3 
contains the survey description and descriptive results; in Section 4 we explain the empirical strategy; 
Section 5 presents the econometric results; in Section 6 we describe an alternative search model. In 
Section 8, we present some concluding remarks. 
   4 
 
2.  Choice Experiment Design  
 
The choice experiment design is based upon a sequential search model, and we find evidence to 
support it because 67% of consumers in our sample search as they drive by. Sequential search 
consists of obtaining one price quote at a time and then based upon the information available decide 
whether the expected benefits (or reduction in purchasing costs) exceed the cost of an additional 
draw. In the sequential search model, the optimal rule is characterized by a reservation price that 
makes the consumer indifferent between purchasing at the lowest price drawn so far and obtaining an 
additional draw. There are differences in the expectation formation mechanism across models, which 
yield different search rules and reservation prices (Rothschild, (1973, 2001); Reinganum, (1979); Lewis, 
(2005); Yang and Ye, (2008)). However, it is not our interest to examine how consumers form their 
expectations, thus in the design we assume this away by asking respondents for the price they expect 
to pay for a gallon of gasoline, and use it as an anchor in the subsequent questions. 
The survey posed respondents with a hypothetical scenario, were they were told to assume 
they were driving in their car and had to purchase gasoline. Respondents were first asked for the 
price they expected to pay for a gallon of gasoline. Then they were given a price quote for free 
framed as the price they observe in the first gas station they see.  The price quote is randomly 
assigned to one of four treatments: 2.5% below, 5% below, 2.5% above or 5% above the price the 
consumer stated he expected to pay. The baseline is the case where the price at the hypothetical gas 
station  is  equal  to  the  consumer’s  expected  price.  After  observing  the  price  quote,  and  being 
reminded of the price they told us they expect to pay, respondents were given 2 choices: (a) would 
you buy gasoline at that gas station, or (b) would you keep driving to the next gas station that is one 
mile down the road. There is a search cost associated with driving to the next gas station: the 5 
 
gasoline spent driving, plus the time it takes to get there
2. If the respondent did not choose to keep 
driving to the next gas station, he moves on to the next section; if he chose to keep driving , then he 
must answer a follow up question where he observes a new price (which is  also randomized in the 
same fashion) and he must choose between the same two alternatives, plus the option to recall the 
price observed at the previous gas station, incurring the same cost.  
In a sequential search model, the search rule compares the expected gains from acquiring an 
additional price quote,  to the search cost. Consider the case in our survey where a consumer is 
driving in his car and has to purchase one gallon of gasoline.  At the first hypothetical gas station (j), 
consumer i can observe the first price quote for free, thus the expenditure from purchasing one 
gallon of gasoline at the posted price is 𝑋 𝑝,?  = 𝑝?,?, where the search cost (c) is equal to zero. The 
consumer has the alternative to keep driving to obtain an additional price quote but he does not 
know for certain what the price at the next gas station (gas station  k) will be. In this case the 
expenditure per gallon of gasoline is uncertain and thus his expected expenditure is: ? 𝑋(𝑝,?)  =
? 𝑝 + ?? . Even though the framing of the search cost is varied in the survey, all consumers are told 
that the next gas station is one mile down the road, such that the search cost is deterministic, and 
thus ? 𝑋(𝑝,?)  = ? 𝑝?,?  + ??.  
The consumer’s objective is to minimize his gasoline expenditure, but searching for lower 
prices is costly and incurring the cost of driving for one mile may or may not be worth it because he 
does not know what the price in the next gas station will be. For this reason, the consumer only 
                                                 
2 In the design, we told the consumer that the next gas station was one mile down the road, but provided him with 
different amounts of information regarding the monetary value of the search cost. Consumers were randomly assigned 
to  one  of  the  following  search  cost  treatments:  1)  the  monetary  value  of  the  gasoline  spent  driving  for  one  mile 
considering their car’s mileage per gallon, 2) the 5 minutes it would take them to get to the next gas station or 3) both. 
The remaining respondents are used as a baseline group and are not given an explicit cost treatment. This segment of the 
choice experiment is not the focus of this paper, thus, we control for total search costs, without elaborating on search 
cost treatments.  6 
 
searches if the expenditure at the current retailer given the posted price is greater than the expected 
expenditure at the next gas station, therefore the search rule is given by: 
𝑋? 𝑝,?  = 𝑝?,? > ? 𝑝?,?  + ?? = ? 𝑋?(𝑝,?)           (1) 
Re-arranging, 
? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,? < −??                 (2) 
When the consumer observes a price in the first gas station that is above her expected price, it could 
mean that the entire price distribution has shifted upwards. In our survey, the consumer was given 
no  indication  that  the  prices  at  the  hypothetical  gas  stations  were  a  result  of  a  shift  in  the 
distribution. If the distribution hasn’t shifted, however, this retailer constitutes a high price draw, so 
there exists the possibility of finding a lower price. When the posted price at the hypothetical gas 
station  is  below  the  consumer’s  expected  price,  given  that  the  distribution  has  not  shifted,  it 
constitutes a low price draw, and the consumer will be more likely to take it because he will be less 
likely to find an even lower price. The following implications can be derived from the search rule: 
 
Implication 1: As the difference between expected and posted price increases, search intensity decreases, until no 
search is observed when the price differential equals or exceeds the search cost. 
When the posted price is below the consumer’s expected price, there are no gains from search and 
no search would be observed. Conversely, when posted prices are above the expected price, search 
intensity will be positive, and increasing in the gains from search. 
 
Implication 2: The probability of search is decreasing in the difference between expected and posted price. 
A price that is 5% above expectations is closer to the upper tail of the distribution than a price draw 
2.5% above, implying that the probability of finding an even lower price draw than the 5% increase 
is higher. Likewise, a price that is 5% below expectations is closer to the lower tail than a price 2.5% 
below, implying that the probability of finding a subsequent price draw below the 5% reduction is 7 
 
lower. Thus, the probability of search is expected to decrease linearly as the difference between 
expected and posted prices increases.  
 
 
3.  Empirical Strategy 
 
The goal of the paper is to estimate the effect of price differences on the probability of search, 
which is derived from the search rule in (2). Let 𝑋 𝑝,?  = 𝑝 + ?? + 𝜀?, where 𝑝?,? is the price quote 
observed at the current retailer, ? 𝑝?,?  is the price the consumer expects to pay, ?? is the search 
cost,  and  let  𝜀?~??? 0,𝜎2   be  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  consumers’  expenditure.  Then 
? 𝑋(𝑝,?)  = ? 𝑝 + ??  because ? 𝜀?  =0. 
Let ?? be the consumer’s observed choice which is based on the search rule: 
?? =  
1    ??   ? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,? + 𝜀? < −??
0    ??  ? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,? + 𝜀? ≥ −??
               (3) 
De los Santos (2008) shows that search costs vary by socio-demographic characteristics, such 
as education, age, income and gender. Further, Sorensen (2001) notes that frequency of purchase 
can be regarded as measuring the number of times the information gained from a price search can 
be used before that information “expires.” Therefore, other things being equal, the benefit per 
search is highest for consumers with high purchasing frequency. As mentioned earlier, c is equal to 
the sum of the monetary value of the time spend searching (5 minutes in this case) (T) and the value 
of the gasoline spent driving to the next gas station for one mile (G). Thus we allow the search cost 
to be equal to the sum of the gasoline and time spent driving to the next gas station, plus a function 
of socio-demographic characteristics and purchasing habit, such that ?? = ??? + 𝜃 ? + ? ?. The 
probability that a consumer searches is given by: 8 
 
𝑃 ?? = 1  = 𝑃 ? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,? + 𝜀? < −??? − 𝜃 ? + ? ?   
                   = 𝑃 𝜀? < − ? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,?  − ??? − 𝜃 ? + ? ?       (4) 
Where  ??  contains  socio-demographic  characteristics  and  purchasing  habits,  and  ?  are  the 
corresponding  parameter  values.  If  it  is  further  assumed  that  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  is 
normally  distributed,  𝜀?~𝑁 0,𝜎2 ,  then  after  converting  it  to  standard  normal,  the  probability 
becomes: 








𝜎  ? + ? ?       
𝑃 ?? = 1  = Φ 
𝜀?
𝜎 < −? ? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,?  + 𝜋2?? + 𝜋3 ? + ? ?     (5) 
 
In the design, the time cost is specified to be 5 minutes, so the cost of gasoline and the time cost are 
in different units of measurement. To construct the search cost variable, we first compute the time 
cost as the monetary value of 5 minutes evaluated at the midpoint of the income category of the 
respondent, considering he works 40 hours a week for 52 weeks per year. The gasoline cost equals 
the monetary value of driving for one mile given the price they paid per gallon of gasoline last time 
they filled-up adjusted by the mileage per gallon of their day-to-day vehicle. 
 
 
4.  Survey and Descriptive Results 
 
4.1  Survey Description 
 
An internet survey was conducted among a random sample of 490 drivers over the age of 18 in the 
State of Ohio in 2009 to examine the decision-making process behind consumers’ search decisions. 
In consumer search models, search decisions are endogenous; that is, whether a consumer chooses 9 
 
to price-shop or not depends on her expectations about the distribution of prices, which in turn 
depend on the intensity of search. The internet survey affords us the opportunity to exogenously 
impose prices on consumers searching for gas prices and observe their intended search behavior. 
The survey was conducted through Knowledge Networks using a random sample from their panel 
of drivers in the State of Ohio. This is an online research panel that is representative of both the 
online and offline populations in the U.S
3. The survey is balanced by age, gender and income; it 
consists mainly on white/non-Hispanic respondents and high school graduates, consistent with the 
ethnicity and education distribution of the Ohio population according to the Current Population 
Survey. It had a response rate of 98% on the search and risk variables, with no significant within 
survey attrition. 
To qualify for the survey each panel member must be an adult (18 +) resident in the state of 
Ohio, provide an estimate  of the mileage per gallon of their day -to-day vehicle, and provide the 
amount of money they paid per gallon the last time they filled up.  Once assigned to the survey, 
individuals received a notification email letting them know there was a new survey availa ble, and 
reminders were sent to non-respondents after that. After the data was collected, a post-stratification 
process was used to adjust for any survey non-response and non-coverage due to sample design
4. To 
encourage participation Knowledge Networks off ers modest incentives, such as entering special 
raffles or sweepstakes with both cash and other prizes won. The survey was in the field for 10 days 
and took each individual an average of 30 minutes to complete. 
                                                 
3  The  panel  members  are  randomly  recruited  by  telephone  and  by  self-administered  mail  and  web  surveys,  and 
households are provided with Internet access and hardware if needed. The panel is not limited to current Web users or 
computer owners, and includes households with both listed and unlisted phone numbers, telephone and non-telephone 
households, as well as cell-phone only households. 




Respondents were first asked questions on the vehicles they drive, such as mileage per gallon, and 
the price they paid per gallon last time they purchased gasoline. Next they were asked a set of 
questions related to their expectations on the price per gallon, including the price they expect to pay, 
as well as the minimum and maximum price they think they would pay if they purchased gasoline at 
Table 1:
Willingness to Search Questions framed in 4 different ways
Question # Wording
Question 1 Keeping in mind you have told us you think you can get gas right now for $[E(P)] per gallon, imagine you are driving
in your car and that you need to buy gas. The first station you see has a price of $[X]. The next gas station is one mile
down the road. 
(X is randomly assigned +5%, +2.5%, 0%, -2.5%, -5%; E(P) is the expected price the consumer reported initially)
What would you do?
a.                    I would buy gas at the current gas station 
b.                   I would keep driving towards the next gas station that is one mile down.
Question 2 Keeping in mind you have told us you think you can get gas right now for $[E(P)] per gallon, imagine you are driving
in your car and that you need to buy gas. The first station you see has a price of $[X]. The next gas station is one mile
down the road. Based on the price of gas you paid most recently and the gas mileage you told us your day to day car
gets, driving one mile to the next gas station will cost you $[Gas Cost]. 
Only Gas Cost (X is randomly assigned +5%, +2.5%, 0%, -2.5%, -5%; E(P) is the expected price the consumer reported initially; Gas Cost is
equal to the cost of driving one mile at the reported millage per gallon and price paid last time)
What would you do?
a.                    I would buy gas at the current gas station 
b.                   I would keep driving towards the next gas station that is one mile down the road which will cost $[Gas
Cost].
Question 3 Keeping in mind you have told us you think you can get gas right now for $[E(P)] per gallon, imagine you are driving
in your car and that you need to buy gas. The first station you see has a price of $[X]. The next gas station is one mile
down the road. Getting there will take you 5 minutes. 
(X is randomly assigned +5%, +2.5%, 0%, -2.5%, -5%; E(P) is the expected price the consumer reported initially)
What would you do?
a.        I would buy gas at the current gas station 
b.       I would keep driving towards the next gas station that is one mile down the road and take 5 minutes to get
there. Question 4 Keeping in mind you have told us you think you can get gas right now for $[E(P)] per gallon, imagine you are driving
in your car and that you need to buy gas. The first station you see has a price of $[X]. The next gas station is one mile
down the road. Getting there will take you 5 minutes. Based on the price of gas you paid most recently and the gas
mileage you told us your day to day car gets, driving one mile to the next gas station will cost you $[Gas Cost] 
Both Search 
Costs
(X is randomly assigned +5%, +2.5%, 0%, -2.5%, -5%; E(P) is the expected price the consumer reported initially; Gas Cost is
equal to the cost of driving one mile at the reported millage per gallon and price paid last time)
What would you do?
a.                    I would buy gas at the current gas station 
b.                   I would keep driving towards the next gas station that is one mile down the road which will cost $[Gas






that  time.  Next  respondents  were  faced  with  a  hypothetical  scenario  described  in  the  previous 
section. The first question is presented in Table 1. At the end of the survey, subjects were asked 
questions  on  their  actual  gasoline  purchasing  habits,  such  as  how  they  search  for  prices,  their 
purchasing frequency and brand loyalty, followed by a section of 7 questions on risk preferences. In 
a sequential search environment where consumers are driving around in search for prices, going 
back to a previously visited retailer is not optimal, and so individual risk aversion could make the 
consumer take an early price even when he expects lower prices to be available. 
 
4.2  Descriptive Results 
 
Search is defined as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual answered that he 
would continue driving to the next gas station looking for a lower price when asked the willingness 
to search question, and 0 if he chose to purchase gas at the posted price. First, I examine if there are 
ex-ante  differences  in  expectations  about  prices  or  search  costs  between  searchers  and  non-
searchers.  Searchers  have,  on  average,  a  higher  expected  price  than  non-searchers,  though  the 
differences  are  not  statistically  significant.  Further,  there  are  no  significant  differences  across 




Expected Price, Cost and Risk Average Differences by Search
N Mean N Mean
Expected Price 352 1.89                 
(0.226)
124 1.87                 
(0.165)
0.02                 
(0.067)
Gas+Time Cost 352 2.51                 
(1.445)
124 2.54                 
(1.535)
0.15                 
(0.267)
Risk Aversion 352
35.4                 
(22.25)
124
34.6                 
(21.87)
2.31                 
(5.314)
Note: Standard erros in parentheses.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
Non-Searchers Searchers Diff.12 
 
Descriptive results on search by price change treatment are presented in Table 3. When the 
observed prices are above the reported expected price, 45% of the respondents choose to search 
when prices are 5% higher and 42% when prices are 2.5% higher; whereas when the posted price is 
below the expected price, only 17.7% search when the price is 2.5% lower and 5.9% when it is 5% 
lower.  Observing  search  when  prices  are  equal  to  the  expected  price  or  lower  suggests  that 
respondents could be either making their search decisions based upon an alternative reference price. 
This argument can be discarded because in the willingness to search question the expected price they 
provided was anchored.  
There  are  two  important  issues  to  keep  in  mind:  first,  respondents  were  faced  with  a 
hypothetical scenario in which they were not actually incurring the cost of driving towards the next 
gas station. Second, in the wording of the question respondents were told they are driving in their 
car and realize they have to purchase gasoline, thus there is no way to control if they think that 
driving is not costly because they are already planning on going towards the direction of the next gas 
station. Nonetheless, consumers considering search costs are very close to zero does not explain 
why consumers search when observing posted  prices below their expected price.  In the  results 
section this is further examined. 
 
 
Recall that if the respondent chose to keep driving to the next gas station in the first question, he 
was answered a follow up question that asked him to assume he had arrived to the next gas station. 
The price at the second gas station was randomly assigned to be between 2.5% or 5% above or 
Table 3:
Search Intensity by Price Change Treatment
Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq.
0 53 54.1 55 56.7 70 83.3 79 82.3 95 94.1
1 45 45.9 42 43.3 14 16.7 17 17.7 6 5.9
Total 98 97 84 96 101
Down (+2.5%) Down (+5%) Search Up (+5%) Up (+2.5%) No Change13 
 
below the posted price in the first gas station. After being reminded of the price he expected to pay 
and given the new price, he was asked to choose between: (a) purchasing gasoline at that new gas 
station; (b) driving back to the previous station incurring a cost that is consistent with the one 
specified in the first question; or (3) to keep driving to the next gas station that is one mile down the 
road, incurring the same cost as before.  
The  follow  up  question  was  intended  to  examine  whether  respondents  would  recall  a 
previously observed price, which is inconsistent with optimizing behavior, and found that less than 
16% of consumers that search on the first question choose to drive back, 63% of whom observed a 
price higher at the second gas station. The 16% recall figure, though lower in our survey than what is 
found in the experimental literature (25% or so), suggests that consumers can be experiencing regret 
out of letting go of a lower price, or that they take the new higher price as a piece of information 
that changes their beliefs about the possibility of finding a lower price. 
 
 
5.  Econometric Results 
 
In order to answer the question, when are consumers more willing to search?, we estimate reduced-
form Probit regressions to obtain the effect of the change in the difference in expectations and 
posted prices on the probability of search. We are also interested in testing for differences in the 
probability of search across price-change treatments.  
Let  the  difference  between  expected  and  posted  prices  be  𝑃𝐶 =
? 𝑝? −𝑝?
? 𝑝?  × 100  and  let 
∆𝑝 =  1 ?? 𝑃𝐶 = 5,2 ?? 𝑃𝐶 = 2.5,3 ?? 𝑃𝐶 = 0,4 ?? 𝑃𝐶 = −2.5,5 ?? 𝑃𝐶 = −5 .  Define  the  price 
change operator as: 
?𝑚 =  
1    ??   ∆𝑝 = 𝑚
0    ?? ∆𝑝 ≠ 𝑚
       where  𝑚 =  1,2,3,4,5         (6) 14 
 
The equation to be estimated is: 
𝑃 ?? = 1  = Φ 
𝜀?
𝜎 < −  ?𝑚 ? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,?  ∗ ?𝑚,?
5
𝑚=1 + 𝜋2?? + 𝜋3?𝐶 + 𝜋6?? + 𝜋7𝑃?   (7) 
where: 𝑝?,? is the price observed at the hypothetical gas station; ? 𝑝?,?  is the price the respondent 
expects to pay; ?? is a matrix of socio-demographic characteristics including gender, age, education 
level dummy variables, risk aversion and income evaluated at the midpoint of the reported income 
category; ?𝐶? is the search cost, i.e. the sum of the monetary value of the gasoline and the time spent 
driving to the next gas station; ?? is a matrix of indicators of gasoline purchasing habits such as the 
octane level, brand and store loyalty, if they are in a  discount program, concern about gasoline 
prices, and the type of vehicle they drive; 𝑃?? is a matrix containing indicator variables of frequency 
of purchase, where the base category are consumers that purchase gasoline twice a week or more. 
Details on how all variables are computed are in Appendix II. Results are summarized in Table 4, 
excluding the controls which can be found in Appendix IIIb
5. 
Table  4  contains results  for  4  different specifications  of equation ( 7).  Specification (1) 
corresponds to the estimate of the search rule without controlling for price treatments, specification 
(2) accounts for positive and negative price changes, and specification (3) and (4) control for degrees 
of price changes  and how this interacts with risk preferences . Results indicate that on average 
consumers are significantly more likely to be willing to search as the expected gains from search 
increase. When testing for differences in the probability of search across price -change treatments, 
estimates suggest symmetry, i.e. for the same level of change in the difference between expected and 
posted price, the change in the probability that a consumer searches is equal regardless of  whether 
he faced a price that was above or below her expectations. However, when different levels of price-
changes are allowed, the change in the probability of search when consumers observed posted prices 
                                                 
5 Since the first level of randomization was at the search cost level, all estimates are computed using clustered standard 
errors at the search cost level. 15 
 
5% above their expectations is higher (less negative) compared to the change when posted prices 
were 2.5% above. On the other hand, when posted prices are below expectations, the slope in the 
probability of search with respect to the difference between expected and posted price is statistically 
equal between the respondents that observed prices 5% and 2.5% below their expectations. It must 
be noted that none of the slope coefficients are statistically equal to the slope when the posted price 
matches the expected price.  
The results on the effect of price differences when prices are above expectations are robust 
to controls and specifications, however, the results when prices are below are unstable. This is 
caused by there being 17 respondents who search when prices are 2.5% below, and 6 respondents 
when  prices  are  5%  below,  which  is  a  small  number  of  observations  to  properly  identify  the 
magnitude of the effect. In Appendix I, I present evidence indicating the average expected price is 
not statistically equal across price treatments. In particular, the expected price of the respondents 
that received the minus 2.5% and minus 5% treatments is lower than the average expected price of 
the baseline group. This implies that the absolute difference between expected and posted price is 
smaller. However, in order to guarantee proper randomization, in the design we computed posted 
prices as a proportional increase or decrease relative to expected prices, such that ex-ante differences 
in expected prices should not affect our estimates of the change in the probability of search.  
Most of the control variables do not significantly influence willingness to search (income, 
age, education). Consistent with Sorensen (2001), as purchasing frequency decreases, consumers are 
less likely to be willing to search. The reference category corresponds to respondents that purchase 
gasoline twice a week or more. As is shown in Appendix III, respondents that purchase gasoline once 
a week are less likely to search than the reference category, and those that purchase once a month are 
even less likely, and so on. The controls on degree of concern regarding gasoline prices are statistically 
significant; as respondents are more concerned about gasoline price fluctuations they are significantly 16 
 
more likely to search. Brand loyalty and store loyalty are not significant, though those consumers that 
receive fuel discounts are significantly more likely to search. This indicates that respondents that are 
already looking for ways to reduce their gasoline expenditure search more, and this is corroborated 




Estimates of the Probability of Search
a/, Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Difference 
b/                                                               
(Expected Price - Posted Price)
-0.233***                
(0.020)
- - -
Up * Price Difference                                                                  
(Up=1 if Price +5% or +2.5%)
- -0.284***                
(0.111)
- -
Down * Price Difference                                                
(Down=1 if Price -5% or -2.5%)
- -0.396***                
(0.034)
- -
I(5%) * Price Difference                                                
(I(5%)=1 if Price +5%)
- - -0.271***                
(0.102)
-0.339***                
(0.111)
I(2.5%) * Price Difference                                                
(I(2.5%)=1 if Price +2.5%)
- - -0.501***                
(0.122)
-0.625***                
(0.135)
I(-2.5%) * Price Difference                                                
(I(-2.5%)=1 if Price -2.5%)
- - 0.001                
(0.139)
-0.261***                
(0.088)
I(-5%) * Price Difference                                                
(I(-5%)=1 if Price -5%)
- - -0.189**                
(0.067)
-0.338***                
(0.029)
Total Search Cost 
b/                                                        
(Gasoline Cost + Time Cost)
-0.879                
(0.957)
-0.867                
(0.965)
-0.946                
(1.007)
-0.931                
(1.040)
Risk                                                                                
(0=do not like risk, 10= fully prepared)
-0.000                
(0.000)
- 0.000                
(0.000)
-
Risk * Up                                                            
(Up=1 if Price +5% or +2.5%)                  
- -0.000**                
(0.000)
- -0.001***                
(0.000)
Risk * Down                                                            
(Down=1 if Price -5% or -2.5%)                  
- 0.003***                
(0.001)
- 0.003**                
(0.001)
Tests for Differences in Price Change Interactions 
c/
Up * Price Diff. =  Down* Price Diff. - 0.93 - -
I(5%) *Price Diff. = I(2.5%) *Price Diff. - - 36.87*** 75.95***
I(-5%) * Price Diff. = I( -2.5%) * Price Diff. - - 7.31*** 1.62
I(-5%) * Price Diff. = I( -2.5%) * Price Diff. = 0 - - 58.91*** 314.52***
N 476 476 476 476
R
2 0.217 0.230 0.228 0.243
a/ Regression results include all control variables. Full results are presented in Appendix III. 
b/ Price differences and Search Costs in US$.
c/ Test statistics are presented.
Note: Standard Errors clustered at the search cost treatment level in Parentheses.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.17 
 
The first implication of the general search rule described in Section 2, indicates that no 
search should be observed among consumers that observe prices equal or below the expected price 
because  independently  of  the  search  cost,  there  are  no  gains  from  search.  This  holds,  even  if 
consumers are considering search costs are very close to zero, either because they are presented with 
a hypothetical scenario, because the gas station is on the way to get somewhere else, or even if they 
consider search costs are incurred each time they go out to sample multiple gas stations in search for 
lower prices. The possibility that they are considering an alternative reference price can be discarded 
because in each question the expected price they reported was anchored, i.e. they were reminded of 
the price they told us they expected to pay. The second implication of the general search rule is that 
the probability of search is decreasing in the difference between expected and posted prices. The 
results on both, search intensity where we find positive search when prices are below expectations, 
and the  different  changes in  the  probability  of search for different  price-change treatments are 
inconsistent with the sequential search rule.  
Even though respondents were not given any indication that the distribution of prices had 
changed when they were provided the first price in the hypothetical gas station, and since we cannot 
control for changes in beliefs, there exists the possibility that respondents took the posted price to 
update their expectations on the price they could find. If respondents used Bayes’ rule to update 
their expectations they would consider the posted price as a signal that the distribution of prices has 
shifted, and use it to form a posterior expectation of what the price would be in the next gas station.  
When respondents face prices above expectation, it would be possible to obtain a pattern in 
the probability of search consistent with our results only if consumers update their expectations 
faster when the posted price is 5% above expectations compared to when it is 2.5% above. Such 
that the  difference  between the  posterior expectation on prices (updated) and the  posted  price 
would be smaller for consumers observing a price 5% above compared to those observing a price 18 
 
2.5% above their prior beliefs (ex-ante expectations). However, as in the sequential search rule 
without updating, even if respondents are using the new information to update their expectations no 
search should be observed when prices are below ex-ante expectations. Moreover, we anchored the 
price they reported they expected to pay in the framing of the question, so it is unlikely that used the 
new prices to update their expectations. 
 
 
6.  Alternative Search Model based on Prospect Theory:  
 
There is an alternative explanation that is consistent with our results. Prospect theory postulates that 
consumers value current prices compared to a reference price, in this case the price they reported 
they expect to pay, and as a consequence they will value positive price variations differently from 
negative price variations. An integral part of prospect theory is the notion that the consumer does 
mental accounting to deal with changes with respect to a reference point. Hence, an increase in price 
relative to the consumer’s reference price in the consumer mental account is experienced as a loss, 
therefore making it more likely for the individual to search in order to compensate for that loss. 
Conversely, a price decrease relative to the consumer’s reference price is viewed as a gain, thus 
deterring search.  
  Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), assume that the consumer derives utility from finding a 
good deal, i.e. she derives utility from how the posted price compares to her reference price, such 
that utility is of the following form: 
?? 𝑝,?  = 𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??  + 𝜀? 
Where ?? is the reference price, 𝑝?,? is the price observed at gas station j, and ?? is the search cost, 𝜀? 
accounts  for  individual  heterogeneity,  and  𝑣 ∙   has  the  properties  of  the  value  function  in 19 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) such that it is concave in gains (v’’<0) and convex in losses (v’’>0). 
In her decision to search, the consumer then compares the utility he can derive from purchasing at 
the price at the first gas station, which in our case is given to her without incurring any search cost, 
with the expected utility of searching for a lower price, where she has to incur a cost. The consumer 
then searches if the utility derived from the current posted price is lower than the expected utility in 
the gas station k: 
?? 𝑝,?  = 𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,?  < ?𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??  = ??? 𝑝,?            (8) 
In our design we anchored the price the individual expected to pay as the reference price, so we can 
assume  ?? = ? 𝑝? ,  and  if  we  allow  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  the  utility  function  to  be 
distributed 𝜀?~𝑁 0,𝜎2 , the search rule is: 
?? 𝑝,?  = 𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,?  + 𝜀? < ? 𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? − ??  + 𝜀?  ≡ ?𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? − ??  = ??? 𝑝,?    (9) 
The probability that the consumer searches is then given by: 
𝑃 ??𝑎??ℎ = 1  = Φ 𝜀? < −𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,?  + ?𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??              (10) 
The change in the probability of search for a unit change in the difference between the reference 
price and the posted price is given by: 
𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?  = ϕ −𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,?  + ?𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??   −𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,?       (11) 
 
Evaluating the marginal effect of a change in the difference between reference price and the 
posted price  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,?  at four different price-level changes (a 2.5% and a 5% increase, and a 
2.5% and a 5% decrease), yields the following implications. 
Implication 3: In the realm of losses, the change in the probability of search is higher when the posted price is 5% 
above expectations, relative to when it is 2.5% above. 
In the realm of losses, when ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? < 0:  20 
 
 𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? 2.5%  = ϕ −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 2.5%   + ?𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??   −𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 2.5%     
< ϕ −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 5%   + ?𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??   −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 5%    = 𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? 5%   
This  is  follows  from  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 2.5%  > ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 5% ,  which  implies  that  𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 5%   <
𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 2.5%  , such that ϕ −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 5%    < ϕ −𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 2.5%   , and 𝑣′ ? 𝑝?  −
𝑝?,? 5%   < 𝑣′ ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? 2.5%   due to convexity assumption in the realm of losses.  
 
Implication 4: In the realm of gains, the change in the probability of search is higher when the posted price is 2.5% 
below expectations, relative to when it is 5% below. 
In the realm of gains, when ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? > 0:  
 𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? −2.5%  = ϕ 𝜀? < −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −2.5%   + ?𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??   −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −2.5%     
< ϕ 𝜀? < −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −5%   + ?𝑣 ?? − 𝑝?,? − ??   −𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −5%    = 𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? −5%  
This follows from ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −2.5%  < ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −5% , which implies that 𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −5%   >
𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −2.5%  ,  such  that,  holding  everything  else  constant,  ϕ −𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −5%    <
ϕ −𝑣  ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −2.5%    and 𝑣′ ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −5%   < 𝑣′ ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,? −2.5%   due to the concavity 
assumption in the realm of gains.   
In our design, we implicitly assume that 𝑣 ∙  takes the following form: 
𝑣 ? 𝑝?  − 𝑝?,?  =   ?𝑚  ? 𝑝?,?  − 𝑝?,?  ∗ ?𝑚,?
5
𝑚=1  where ?𝑚 =  
1    ??   ∆𝑝 = 𝑚
0    ?? ∆𝑝 ≠ 𝑚
   and 𝑚 =  1,2,3,4,5  
We find that in the realm of losses,  𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? 2.5%  <  𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? 5%  , which is consistent 
with  the  prospect  theory  postulates.  In  the  realm  of  gains,  however,  we  find  that 
 𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? −2.5%  =  𝜕𝑃 ??𝑎?? ℎ=1 
𝜕 ? 𝑝? −𝑝?,?   𝑝?,? −5%   which is not what Implication 4 indicates. The lack 
of statistical differences in this case can be attributed to two factors: first, as mentioned before the 21 
 
number of individuals that chose to search when they received the treatment of a 5% decrease in 
price is very small (6) which can explain why the results are unstable on that side of the curve. 
Second,  the  prospect  theory  value  function  in  the  realm  of  gains  is  flatter,  so  there  exists  the 
possibility that the difference from a 2.5% to a 5% decrease in price is not large enough to generate 
significant  changes  in  the  slope,  which  translates  into  insignificant  differences  in  the  change 
probability of search.  
  Further,  specification  (4)  in  Table  4  presents  estimates  differentiating  how  risk  aversion 
affects the probability of search when prices are above and below expectations. As the value of the 
risk
6 variable decreases risk aversion increases. The coefficient of the interaction between risk and 
the price change indicator is negative when posted prices are above expectations, and positive when 
posted prices are below, both statistically significant. For  the same degree of risk aversion, when 
experiencing losses (i.e. when the posted price is higher ) a consumer is significantly less willing to  
take a gamble and search relative to both, when she experiences gains (i.e. when posted prices are 
lower) and when the posted price matches expectations. These results are  also consistent with loss 
aversion; risk seeking in gains and risk averse in losses.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
An internet survey was conducted among a random sample of drivers in the State of Ohio. We 
found evidence to support the sequential search setting, given that 67% of respondents stated that 
they  search  as  they  drive  by.  We  use  a  randomized  posted  price  design  relative  to  the  price 
respondents expected to pay at the time of the survey to achieve exogenous price variation in order 
                                                 
6 The risk variable is a continuous indicator that takes values between 0 and 10, where 0 indicates the respondent does 
not like to take risk, and 10 indicates he is fully prepared to take risk. 22 
 
to examine the decision making process behind search decisions. Furthermore, we anchored the 
consumer’s expected price in the hypothetical search questions to guarantee that respondents were 
not making search decisions based upon an alternative reference price. 
  Results indicate that among the respondents who faced prices below their expected price, 
only 12% choose to search, whereas 45% search when prices are above. In a sequential set setting, 
no search should be observed among consumers that observe prices equal or below the expected 
price because independently of the search cost, there are no gains from search. Results further 
indicate that the probability of search decreases as the difference between the expected and observed 
price increases, however, it decreases more when prices are 2.5% above expectations than when they 
are 5% higher. When faced with lower posted prices, however, there are no significant differences in 
the slope on the probability of search with respect to price differentials. The probability of search is 
predicted  to  decrease  as  the  difference  between  expected  and  posted  prices  increases,  but  the 
relationship is expected to be linear. 
We provided an explanation to our results based on prospect theory by assuming consumers 
derive utility from finding a good deal, and allow the utility function to be consistent with the 
Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979)  value  function.  In  the  realm  of  losses,  due  to  the  convexity 
assumption, the marginal utility of obtaining a price slightly below the price they observe is lower 
when the posted price is 5% above the reference price, thus the probability of search decreases less 
when the price is 5% compared to when it is 2.5% above expectations. In the realm of gains (when 
prices are below) however, due to the concavity assumption, the marginal utility of obtaining an 
even lower price is higher when prices are 2.5% below the reference price than when they are 5% 
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Apendix I, Price Treatment Distribution by Search Cost Treatment
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Plus 5% 23 21.10       26 21.67       25 20.16       24 19.35       98
Plus 2.5% 17 15.60       35 29.17       16 12.90       30 24.19       98
No Change 18 16.51       18 15.00       31 25.00       17 13.71       84
Minus 2.5% 25 22.94       23 19.17       23 18.55       25 20.16       96
Minus 5% 26 23.85       18 15.00       29 23.39       28 22.58       101
Total 109 120 124 124 477
Price 
Treatment
Total No Cost  Gas Cost  Time Cost  Gas+Time Cost 
Table 6:
Appendix I, Expected Price Differences by Price Treatment
Price 
Treatment
Mean Plus 5% Plus 2.5% No Change Minus 2.5% Minus 5%
Plus 5% 1.89                
(0.021)
- - - - -
Plus 2.5% 1.86                
(0.020)
0.02                
(0.028)
- - - -
No Change 1.84                
(0.020)
0.04                
(0.027)
0.01                
(0.025)
- - -
Minus 2.5% 1.90                
(0.021)
-0.01                
(0.029)
-0.03                
(0.027)
-0.05**                
(0.027)
- -
Minus 5% 1.92                
(0.024)
-0.03                
(0.034)
-0.06*                
(0.033)
-0.08**                
(0.033)
-0.02                
(0.034)
-
Note: Standard erros in parentheses.




   
Table 7:
Appendix I, Total Search Cost Differences by Cost Treatment
Search Cost 
Treatment
Mean No Cost Gas Cost Time Cost Both Costs
No Cost 2.52                     
(0.128)
- - - -
Gas Cost 2.47                     
(0.125)
0.04                     
(0.181)
- - -
Time Cost 2.44                     
(0.129)
0.07                     
(0.189)
0.02                     
(0.187)
- -
Both Costs 2.64                     
(0.132)
-0.12                     
(0.193)
-0.17                     
(0.192)
-0.19                     
(0.197)
-
Note: Standard erros in parentheses.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
Table 8:
Tests on Individual Characteristics by Price Treatment
Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq.
Education
Less than High School 10 9.9 7 7.0 9 10.6 7 7.1 9 8.6
High School Degree 37 36.6 30 30.0 27 31.8 39 39.4 29 27.6
Some College 32 31.7 28 28.0 29 34.1 26 26.3 31 29.5
Bachelor Degree or Higher 22 21.8 35 35.0 20 23.5 27 27.3 36 34.3
Total 101 100.0 100 100.0 85 100.0 99 100.0 105 100.0
Ethnicity
White 87 86.1 89 89.0 69 81.2 81 81.8 96 91.4
Black 9 8.9 7 7.0 7 8.2 8 8.1 4 3.8
Other, Non-Hispanic 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 2 2.0 0 0.0
Hispanic 2 2.0 1 1.0 3 3.5 4 4.0 1 1.0
2+ Races, Non-Hispanic 3 3.0 3 3.0 5 5.9 4 4.0 4 3.8
Total 101 100.0 100 100.0 85 100.0 99 100.0 105 100.0
Gender
Male 50 49.5 48 48.0 38 44.7 46 46.5 62 59.1
Female 51 50.5 52 52.0 47 55.3 53 53.5 43 41.0
Total 101 100.0 100 100.0 85 100.0 99 100.0 105 100.0
Income Category
Less than $5,000 2 2.0 1 1.0 1 1.2 1 1.0 2 1.9
$ 5,000 - $ 9,999 3 3.0 3 3.0 3 3.5 4 4.0 1 1.0
$ 10,000 - $ 14,999 3 3.0 3 3.0 3 3.5 6 6.1 2 1.9
$ 15,000 - $ 24,999 8 7.9 6 6.0 5 5.9 7 7.1 10 9.5
$ 25,000 - $ 34,999 11 10.9 13 13.0 10 11.8 9 9.1 8 7.6
$ 35,000 - $ 49,999 30 29.7 19 19.0 19 22.4 15 15.2 12 11.4
$ 50,000 - $ 74,999 21 20.8 26 26.0 21 24.7 24 24.2 27 25.7
$ 75,000 - $ 99,999 12 11.9 15 15.0 14 16.5 19 19.2 23 21.9
$ 100,000 - $ 149,999 7 6.9 11 11.0 8 9.4 9 9.1 19 18.1
$ 150,000 or more 4 4.0 3 3.0 1 1.2 5 5.1 1 1.0
Total 101 100.0 100 100.0 85 100.0 99 100.0 105 100.0










Answer to the questions: You previously told us that the last time you bought gas, you paid about $[P] per gallon. Do
you think this is the price you would pay for gas right now if you shopped around? If they answered no, then they
were asked the following quesstion: What do you think you would currently pay per gallon
([P] is the price they paid the last time they purchased gasoline)
Gas Cost (Millage per gallon of the car day-to-day vehicle) * (Price paid last time)
Timce Cost (5 / 60) * (Midpoint of Income Category / 2080). Where 2080 is the annual worked hours, corresponding to working
40 hours per week for 52 weeks.
Search Cost Sum of the monetary value of the gasoline spent to drive one mile adjusted by the day-to-day vehicle mileage per
gallon plus the monetary value of the time spent driving for 5 minutes (Gas Cost + Time Cost).
Frequency 
of Purchase
Answer to the question: Approximately how often do you buy gas? 1) Twice a week; 2) Once a week; 3) Every other
week; 4) Once a month or less.
Age Age
Education Categorical variable of the level of education of the respondent: 1) Incomplete high school; 2) High school degree; 3)
Some college; 4) Bachelor's degree or more.
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if male.
Loyalty Categorical variable in respose to the questions: Do you usually buy gas from the same location? If answered No,




People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your willingness to take risks in financial
matters? where the value 0 means: “Don’t like to take risks,” and the value 10 means: “Fully prepared to take risks,.
Octane 
Level
Dummy variable equal to 1 if they purchase regular unleaded.
Fuel 
Discount
Dummy variable equal to 1 if they answered yes to the following question: When you buy gas, do you receive any fuel 
discounts, for example due to incentive schemes such as Giant Eagle Fuel Perks, Kroger Fuel Saver Rewards or




Categorical variable equal to 1 if they responded they are not concerned with gasoline price fluctuations, 2 if they are
somewhat concerned, 3 if they are very concerned, and 4 if they are extremely concerned.
Car type Categorical variable equal to 1 if the respondent's day-to-day vehicle is a 2 door coupe, 2 if it is a 4-door coupe, 3 if it




   
Appendix IIIa:
Estimates of the Probability of Search
a/, Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Expected Gains                                                 
(Posted Price - Expected Price)
-0.233***                
(0.020)
- - - - 0.229***                
(0.008)
- - - -
Up * Price Difference                            
(Up=1 if Price +5% or +2.5%)
- -0.284***                
(0.111)
- - - - 0.279***                
(0.101)
- - -
Down * Price Difference                            
(Down=1 if Price -5% or -2.5%)
- -0.396***                
(0.034)
- - - - 0.396***                
(0.023)
- - -
5% * Price Difference                            
(5%=1 if Price +5%)
- - -0.271***                
(0.102)
-0.339***                
(0.111)
-0.352***                
(0.094)
- - 0.261***                
(0.091)
0.332***                
(0.098)
0.351***                
(0.081)
2.5% * Price Difference                            
(2.5%=1 if Price +2.5%)
- - -0.501***                
(0.122)
-0.625***                
(0.135)
-0.599***                
(0.165)
- - 0.475***                
(0.098)
0.610***                
(0.108)
0.569**                
(0.146)
d5% * Price Difference                            
(d2.5%=1 if Price -2.5%)
- - 0.001                
(0.139)
-0.261***                
(0.088)
-0.380*                
(0.193)
- - 0.010                
(0.139)
0.275***                
(0.083)
0.390**                
(0.194)
d5% * Price Difference                            
(d5%=1 if Price -5%)
- - -0.189**                
(0.067)
-0.338***                
(0.029)
-0.214*                
(0.111)
- - 0.196**                
(0.074)
0.343***                
(0.034)
0.227**                
(0.110)
Total Search Cost 
b/                                                        
(Gasoline Cost + Time Cost)
-0.879                
(0.957)
-0.867                
(0.965)
-0.946                
(1.007)
-0.931                
(1.040)
-0.965                
(1.030)
- - - - -
Gas Cost - - - - - -0.078                
(0.094)
-0.075                
(0.093)
-0.077                
(0.098)
-0.069                
(0.098)
-0.073                
(0.096)
SC 3                                                
(SC3=1 if Time Cost)
- - - - - -0.094***                
(0.013)
-0.098***                
(0.013)
-0.086***                
(0.016)
-0.091***                
(0.014)
-0.093***                
(0.016)
SC 4                                                
(SC4=1 if Time+Gas Cost)
- - - - - 0.012                
(0.047)
0.001                
(0.038)
0.036                
(0.032)
0.035                
(0.028)
0.032                
(0.032)
SC 2 * Gas Cost                              
(SC2=1 if Gas Cost)
- - - - - -0.004                
(0.019)
-0.020                
(0.016)
-0.012                
(0.021)
-0.036**                
(0.015)
-0.037**                
(0.016)
SC 4 * Gas Cost                              
(SC4=1 if Time+Gas Cost)
- - - - - -0.059                
(0.046)
-0.056                
(0.039)
-0.090***                
(0.028)
-0.104***                
(0.029)
-0.098***                
(0.027)
Risk                                                        
(0=do not like risk, 10= fully prepared)
-0.000                
(0.000)
- 0.000                
(0.000)
- - 0.000                
(0.000)
- 0.000                
(0.000)
- -
Risk * Up                                                            
(Up=1 if Price +5% or +2.5%)                  
- -0.000**                
(0.000)
- -0.001***                
(0.000)
- - -0.000*                
(0.000)
- -0.001***                
(0.000)
-
Risk * Down                                                            
(Down=1 if Price -5% or -2.5%)                  
- 0.003***                
(0.001)
- 0.003**                
(0.001)
- 0.003**                
(0.001)
- 0.003**                
(0.001)
-
Risk * 5%                                                            
(Up=1 if Price +5%)                  
- - - - -0.002***                
(0.000)
- - - - -0.002***                
(0.000)
Risk * 2.5%                                                            
(Up=1 if Price  2.5%)                  
- - - - -0.001**                
(0.000)
- - - - -0.001*                
(0.000)
Risk * (-2.5%)                                                            
(Up=1 if Price -2.5%)                  
- - - - 0.005**                
(0.002)
- - - - 0.005**                
(0.002)
Risk * (-5%)                                                            
(Up=1 if Price -5%)                  
- - - - 0.000                
(0.002)
- - - - 0.000                
(0.002)
N 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476
R
2 0.217 0.230 0.2284 0.2426 0.2459 0.224 0.237 0.234 0.248 0.252
a/ Regression results include all control variables. Full results are presented in Appendix III. 
b/ Price differences and Search Costs in US$.
Note: Standard Errors clustered at the search cost treatment randomization level in Parentheses.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.




Control Variable Results of Estimates of the Probability of Search
a/, Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Frequency 2                                             
(=1 if Once a Week)
-0.108***                
(0.015)
-0.109***                
(0.016)
-0.120***                
(0.023)
-0.117***                
(0.018)
-0.118***                
(0.018)
-0.114***                
(0.005)
-0.114***                
(0.009)
-0.123***                
(0.012)
-0.119***                
(0.007)
-0.120***                
(0.009)
Frequency 3                                                 
(=1 if Twice a Month)
-0.118***                
(0.025)
-0.116***                
(0.024)
-0.119***                
(0.025)
-0.119***                
(0.022)
-0.121***                
(0.023)
-0.128***                
(0.027)
-0.126***                
(0.028)
-0.128***                
(0.026)
-0.127***                
(0.025)
-0.129***                
(0.027)
Frequency 4                                                      
(=1 Once a Month or less)
-0.121**                
(0.045)
-0.118**                
(0.037)
-0.119**                
(0.041)
-0.121**                
(0.035)
-0.122***                
(0.035)
-0.121**                
(0.046)
-0.118**                
(0.041)
-0.118**                
(0.042)
-0.120**                
(0.039)
-0.120**                
(0.039)
Income                                              
(midpoint of Income Category)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
0.000                
(0.000)
Age -0.002                
(0.001)
-0.001                
(0.001)
-0.002                
(0.002)
-0.002                
(0.002)
-0.002                
(0.002)
-0.001                
(0.001)
-0.001                
(0.001)
-0.002                
(0.002)
-0.002                
(0.002)
-0.002                
(0.002)
Educ 2                                                        
(=1 if High school diploma)
0.051                
(0.052)
0.032                
(0.049)
0.043                
(0.055)
0.025                
(0.046)
0.020                
(0.042)
0.039                
(0.059)
0.019                
(0.058)
0.032                
(0.062)
0.013                
(0.055)
0.009                
(0.051)
Educ 3                                                       
(=1 if some college)
0.077                
(0.086)
0.076                
(0.082)
0.066                
(0.082)
0.063                
(0.079)
0.062                
(0.077)
0.072                
(0.089)
0.070                
(0.086)
0.063                
(0.085)
0.059                
(0.083)
0.059                
(0.082)
Educ 4                                                        
(=1 if Bachelors or more)
0.100                
(0.096)
0.091                
(0.085)
0.079                
(0.089)
0.072                
(0.080)
0.072                
(0.077)
0.092                
(0.101)
0.083                
(0.092)
0.072                
(0.095)
0.064                
(0.087)
0.065                
(0.085)
Gender                                                       
(=1 if male)
0.016                
(0.025)
0.013                
(0.025)
0.012                
(0.018)
0.005                
(0.019)
0.008                
(0.018)
0.020                
(0.022)
0.016                
(0.022)
0.015                
(0.016)
0.009                
(0.017)
0.012                
(0.015)
Store Loyalty                                                    
(=1 if buys at same location)
-0.072                
(0.051)
-0.083*                
(0.057)
-0.070                
(0.057)
-0.080                
(0.057)
-0.084                
(0.058)
-0.067                
(0.046)
-0.077                
(0.050)
-0.065                
(0.052)
-0.076                
(0.050)
-0.079                
(0.051)
Brand Loyalty                                             
(=1 if buys from same provider)
-0.018                
(0.042)
-0.030                
(0.044)
-0.021                
(0.047)
-0.031                
(0.040)
-0.037                
(0.040)
-0.016                
(0.041)
-0.029                
(0.042)
-0.021                
(0.044)
-0.033                
(0.035)
-0.038                
(0.037)
Regular Unleaded                               
(=1 if buys regular unleaded)
0.111                
(0.045)
0.113*                
(0.041)
0.112*                
(0.038)
0.112*                
(0.040)
0.115*                
(0.041)
0.105                
(0.053)
0.110*                
(0.048)
0.108*                
(0.044)
0.109*                
(0.045)
0.113*                
(0.046)
Fuel Discount                                                           
(=1 if receives fuel discounts)
0.049***                
(0.012)
0.042***                
(0.013)
0.058***                
(0.013)
0.056***                
(0.012)
0.055***                
(0.012)
0.048***                
(0.010)
0.040***                
(0.012)
0.056***                
(0.010)
0.052***                
(0.008)
0.051***                
(0.009)
Concern 1                                                           
(=1 if not concerned)
-0.208***                
(0.031)
-0.202***                
(0.035)
-0.204***                
(0.029)
-0.200***                
(0.034)
-0.200***                
(0.034)
-0.208***                
(0.028)
-0.203**                
(0.030)
-0.203***                
(0.024)
-0.200***                
(0.026)
-0.200***                
(0.025)
Concern 2                                                           
(=1 if somewhat concerned)
-0.277***                
(0.038)
-0.292***                
(0.029)
-0.275***                
(0.036)
-0.286***                
(0.029)
-0.291***                
(0.025)
-0.283***                
(0.051)
-0.297***                
(0.043)
-0.279***                
(0.046)
-0.290***                
(0.041)
-0.295***                
(0.037)
Concern 3                                                           
(=1 if very concerned)
-0.137**                
(0.046)
-0.140**                
(0.048)
-0.130**                
(0.047)
-0.127**                
(0.048)
-0.132**                
(0.046)
-0.136**                
(0.050)
-0.139**                
(0.052)
-0.128**                
(0.050)
-0.126***                
(0.051)
-0.130**                
(0.049)
Car Type 1                                                           
(=1 if 2-door coupe)
0.009                
(0.085)
0.009                
(0.071)
0.004                
(0.082)
0.001                
(0.075)
0.000                
(0.078)
0.010                
(0.084)
0.009                
(0.071)
0.004                
(0.079)
-0.001                
(0.073)
-0.000                
(0.077)
Car Type 3                                                           
(=1 if Pickup Truck)
-0.057                
(0.078)
-0.056                
(0.090)
-0.062                
(0.074)
-0.056                
(0.086)
-0.056                
(0.086)
-0.048                
(0.081)
-0.047                
(0.093)
-0.055                
(0.076)
-0.047                
(0.089)
-0.046                
(0.088)
Car Type 4                                                           
(=1 if Other)
0.068                
(0.099)
0.080                
(0.068)
0.067                
(0.086)
0.081                
(0.075)
0.080                
(0.078)
0.058                
(0.100)
0.072                
(0.070)
0.056                
(0.085)
0.072                
(0.074)
0.071                
(0.078)
Car Type 5                                                           
(=1 if sports or luxury car)
0.131                
(0.109)
0.134                
(0.102)
0.134                
(0.092)
0.139                
(0.098)
0.134                
(0.105)
0.127                
(0.115)
0.134                
(0.107)
0.131                
(0.096)
0.143                
(0.102)
0.137                
(0.110)
Car Type 6                                                           
(=1 if Mini-Van or SUV)
-0.028                
(0.040)
-0.021                
(0.039)
-0.029                
(0.037)
-0.027                
(0.035)
-0.026                
(0.036)
-0.019                
(0.038)
-0.012                
(0.037)
-0.021                
(0.036)
-0.020                
(0.034)
-0.017                
(0.035)
N 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476
R
2 0.217 0.230 0.2284 0.2426 0.2459 0.224 0.237 0.234 0.248 0.252
a/ Regression results include all control variables. Full results are presented in Appendix III. 
b/ Price differences and Search Costs in US$.
Note: Standard Errors clustered at the search cost treatment randomization level in Parentheses.
*** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value< 0.1.
Total Search Costs With Search Cost Treatment Effects